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Abstract 
This commentary complements the article by De Dreu and Gross (2019) from the perspectives of 
behavioral economics and game theory. It aims to provide a bridge between the psychology / 
neuroscience research with that of economic research in attack-and-defense by stipulating relevant 
literature, clarifying theoretical structures, and suggesting improvements in experimental designs 
and possible further investigations.    
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forthcoming in the Behavioral and Brain Sciences. 
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Commentary  
De Drew and Gross (2019) survey the literature on various behavioral aspects of attack-and-
defense. While focusing mainly in the areas of Psychology and Neuroscience, they often use game 
theoretic structure, and results from Behavioral Economics to construct their review. The aim of 
this commentary is to complement their analyses with further relevant readings from Behavioral 
Economics and Game Theory, such that the baseline theoretical predictions may be clearer. We 
also provide some suggestions for the improvement and advancement of the experimental studies. 
 
First, consider the game theoretic aspects of attack-and-defense. Any conflict has the feature that 
the involved parties expend resources to win (or to avoid loss) and, irrespective of the outcome, 
the resources expended become sunk. ‘Contest Theory’ is the area of game theory that analyzes 
these situations. There are two popular functions to determine the probability of winning of player 
𝑖 in such games. Both take the form: 𝑝𝑖 = (𝑥𝑖
𝑟/∑ 𝑥𝑖
𝑟
𝑖 ) where 𝑝𝑖 is the winning probability and 𝑥𝑖 
is the resources spent by player 𝑖, and 𝑟 ≥ 0 is a parameter. When the outcome of a conflict is 
deterministic, i.e., when a player who expends even a little more resources than the rivals wins for 
sure, then it is an all-pay auction (Baye et al., 1996) and 𝑟 = ∞. However, when there is enough 
noise in the conflict and the outcome is not that straightforward, then it is modeled as a ‘lottery’ 
(Tullock, 1980) and 𝑟 = 1. Individual attack-and-defense conflicts feature rank-order spillovers, 
and these two types provide very different results (see Baye et al. (2012) for all-pay auction, and 
Chowdhury and Sheremeta (2011) for lottery). Whereas all-pay auction is covered at the end of 
Section II.2, the important case of lottery is not considered. 
 
The game-theoretic and behavioral models of attack-and-defense involve network externalities. 
But the those for individual players and for groups are distinct (it is unclear in the article, see 
footnote iv). See reviews of the theoretical and the experimental research by Kovenock and 
Roberson (2012), and by Dechenaux et al. (2015). 
 
In the individual multi-battle contests, players fight on multiple battlefields with limited resources. 
There may be an attacker (terrorist) who tries to destroy such battlefields, and a defender 
(government) who tries to save those. Here the battlefields are connected as weakest-link for the 
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defender, and as best-shot for the attacker. The theoretical solution for such models are provided 
in Clark and Konrad (2007), Arce et al. (2012), Kovenock and Roberson (2018) etc. Experimental 
evidences (Kovenock et al., 2018) find that the theory predicts subject behavior better for all-pay 
auction than for lottery.  
 
In a group-conflict group-members exert resources that go through a production technology to 
create ‘group-effort’, which then determine the winning group. The technology can be additive (an 
easy version of this with all-pay auction a la Baik et al. (2001) is considered in the article), or it 
can be something else. For attack-and-defense, the attackers face a best-shot whereas the defenders 
face a weakest-link technology. The solutions are included in Chowdhury and Topolyan (2016a) 
for all-pay auction and in Chowdhury and Topolyan (2016b) for lottery; and the predictions are 
very different. Currently there is no experimental research investigating such situations. 
 
Note some important discontents between psychology/neuroscience and economics experiments. 
Whereas economists stress on using theoretical benchmark to understand behavioral mechanisms, 
others apply distinct techniques (e.g., fMRI). However, it is possible to combine both and arrive 
at better understandings. Different areas also often re-arrive on results that are not shared. For 
example, the high dispersion result (Section IV.3) is recognized as ‘overspreading’ in economics 
(Chowdhury et al., 2014), but is never tested for an attack-and-defense frame.  
 
For the individual attack-and-defense research, the article introduces a normal form AD game. 
This (reproduced in Table 1) suggests that although the theoretical equilibrium is in symmetric 
mixed strategies, in reality defenders will choose ‘defend’ more than attackers choose ‘attack’.  
 
Table 1. Proposed AD-game 
 
 Attacker 
Not Attack Attack 
Defender Not Defense 2, 1 0, 2 
Defense 1, 1 1, 0 
 
Indeed, that turns out to be the case in the experiments, and it is explained through the idea of loss-
aversion. The subjects seemed to view the game as in Table 2. Since loss-averse defenders weigh 
the negative amounts higher than their numerical values and play ‘defense’ more.   
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Table 2. Intended AD-game 
 
 Attacker 
Not Attack Attack 
Defender Not Defense    2, 1 2-2, 1-1+2 
Defense 2-1, 1 2-1, 1-1+0 
 
However, until the game is framed as in Table 2 explicitly, it is unlikely that subjects understand 
the game in such a way. They view the game as in Table 1, and choose the ‘defense’ option since 
that is the riskless option.  
 
Chowdhury et al. (2018) investigate the same but introduce a game with lottery and continuous 
level of resources (instead of only two-options). They essentially provide a general version of 
Table 2, control for risk, and still provide support for of loss-aversion in attack-and-defense.  
 
The simple AD-game in Table 1 cannot reflect the sunk cost of conflict, and the one in Table 2 is 
simply an easy version of Chowdhury et al. (2018) with binomial space and all-pay auction. Hence, 
it will be interesting to investigate a similar general set-up as in Chowdhury et al. (2018) but with 
all-pay auction – as implemented in the current study. It will also be useful to control for risk 
behavior along with the other behavioral aspects as detailed in the current study.  
 
The target article successfully presents the audience with an overview of attack-and-defense 
experiments (mainly) from psychology and neuroscience. We point out, to bridge between those 
areas and behavioral economics / game theory, existing games that may be better fit to investigate 
the same questions, will allow theoretical benchmark and behavioral mechanisms for predicted 
results. We also note that the current economics experiments do not exploit the techniques (e.g., 
response time, cognitive ability, eye tracking, neurological effects etc.) employed regularly in 
psychology and neuroscience. Employing such techniques can provide broader knowledge. We 
hope for such bridge to attain in the future.  
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